As the title suggests this is a bot which is spread by brute forcing SSH daemons and exploiting IoT devices using an array of exploits — this malware is mainly distributed by a Chinese actor who is familiar with C++ and C constructs, however the knowledge of C++ by this threat actor only extends to using the
std::string class in C++. This bot was being distributed a few years ago just for x86_64 targets, this has changed along with some key fundementals of the bot. It’s started to target embedded systems, which is why I thought I would cover it again. Linux/AES.DDoS is programmed in C++, we can see this due to the fact that all of the symbols are exported and C++ constructs are used.
We are going to be using:
- gdb-peda: https://github.com/longld/peda
- BinaryNinja: https://binary.ninja/
- ltrace: https://linux.die.net/man/1/ltrace
- radare2: http://rada.re/r/
A look at the file..
If we run ‘file’ on the executable we get:
ELF 32-bit LSB executable, ARM, EABI5 version 1 (SYSV), statically linked, for GNU/Linux 2.6.14, not stripped.
So, we’re working with an ELF (which is the COFF for UNIX systems) and it’s 32 bit. It’s architecture is of type ARM and all of the libraries its using are statically linked — this is normal behaviour of an IoT bot to have its libc linked as many systems will have incomplete or sometimes even broken libraries. So, instead of dynamically linking the executable, they are statically linked. Since its not stripped, this means that the analysis will be a lot easier as we have meaningful names in relation to objects in the executable. For some strange reason, the executable was compiled on a 12 year old version of the Linux kernel — this could indicate to us that the malware was compiled on an IoT device or just has an extremely old computer.
A quick rundown on ARM
ARM is 32 bit by design, so all of our registers are 32 bit wide. In ARM, the standard calling convention is to place the arguments into
r3. That’s only four registers though, if there are more than three arguments then we place the rest of the arguments on the stack. We have 15 registers to play with though, they all serve a special purpose.
- r0, r1, r2, r3 are used for passing arguments, r0 usually also holds the return value of routines.
- r4, r5, r6, r7, r8, r9 are used internally within routines to store variables.
- r10 holds the limit for the current stack.
- r11 holds the stack frame pointer.
- r12 can also be used as a variable within routines, however there is no guarantee that this register will remain unchanged by the caller.
- r13 holds the stack pointer (SP).
- r14 is the link register, which points back to the caller.
- r15 holds the program counter.
Nice, so now you’re an ARM expert we can continue.. ;)
Dive into main(..)..
As soon as the malware boots from the original entry-point
main which is at
0x13DEC. We use
rabin2 to find the original entry point by doing
rabin2 -s kfts | grep "type=FUNC name=main". Which gives us the following output:
vaddr=0x00013dec paddr=0x0000bdec ord=5366 fwd=NONE sz=688 bind=GLOBAL type=FUNC name=main
Nice! The executable isn’t packed. The main method then branches to function named
get_executable_name which reads the symlink
readlink(..). When reading this symlink internally from our process it will return the location from that our executable is running from. We can see from the disassembly that we create a type of
std::string and copy from the char array containing the path of the current executable. This is then used and passed into the function used for persistence.
We then either check if we’re running or add to startup. In the
check_running procedure we do a call to
ps -e then sleep for two seconds; we then get the output from the command and check to see if the current executable name exists in the output. If it does, we continue to branch to
exit with an exit code of 0 (which is placed into r0) which will effectively shut-down the process. If not, we then go onto persistence. So, if we’re already running, we effectively exit the process.
Persistence is achieved by the malware by adding to
/etc/rc.local and the
/etc/init.d/boot.local files (in the
auto_boot function); however before it overwrites this file it first checks to see if it has already done so. The
/etc/rc.local will execute certain commands after all of the systems’ services have started. The way that this is achieved is somewhat amateur as the malware constructs a shell command and then uses the
system function to execute them (which in theory just calls the exec and hangs for a return code from the callee).
A string is formatted and the
sed program is called which writes to the file in question (there are several string operations, such as
sed -i -e '2 i%s/%s' /etc/rc.local is formatted for example). This is then passed to
system, as described above. The buffer used in all of these formatting operations is at the virtual address
0x9F48 and has a size of 300 bytes. Technically, since the input is un-sanitized we could manipulate the path that the malware resides in and utilise a format string exploit. We could therefore manipulate the stack; read local variables, overwrite addresses etc. This is the only persistence method used by the bot.
The process then forks itself and breaks away from its parent by calling
setsid(..). All of the file descriptors are also closed which are inherited from the parent (0-3). A thread is then created to call the
SendInfo function which collects information such as the number of CPUs in the system; the network speed; the amount of load on the system CPUs; the local address of the network adapter.
This routine then calls the subroutine
get_occupy. We can see that we calculate the load average by iterating over all the CPUs in the system. We can see that
r3 is being used for the counter for this loop, then the
blt instruction is executed which branches if the first operand is less than the second. In x86, this is the equivalent of
jle. Please note in earlier versions of this malware a thread used to be created to
backdoorA, however not anymore.
The way the malware gets information regarding the network adapter is reading the
/proc/net/dev file. It then seeks to the start of the file; and parses it to get the local IP address from the default adapter.
What I found strange about this sample of malware is that it created statistics which had no real meaning, for example it would create a random value and use it as the network speed. In the subroutine
fake_net_speed we can see
srandom is seeded with
time — we pass the first parameter ‘0’ into
time as we have no structure to fill (usually, a pointer to
time_t would be passed into this function). We then move the result of
r3; then back into
r0 to be a parameter for
srandom — this is most likely the compiler being strange for some reason or another.
The value generated by this call is then used in a
sprintf statement to create a string which represents the network speed in mega bytes per second (apparently). This is super weird, the malware is creating a fake network speed for some reason.. the only conclusion I can come to regarding this is that someone has hired a programmer and they have failed to implement this feature — so they’re faking it to their client/boss etc.
These values are then sent within this subroutine to the main C2..
After all of these operations we finally come to the main core of the bot; the part where it connects to the C2 and receives commands. The procedure
ConnectServer (which is at
0xCA1C) is called from the main body of the function, this then branches to
0xB5BC) which returns a socket to the C2 server. The global variable
MainSocket is then set to this value. Diving into
ServerConnectCli starts by creating a socket of protocol type TCP, if this operation is not successful then the assembly branches off to a subroutine at
0xB654 which displays the error by calling the
perror(..) function to display a human readable error.
For those of you familiar with C, this is like doing:
The port that we are going to connect to is partly obfuscated by the author. The original number is loaded into the register
r3. We then shift this value by 16 bytes (
0x10) to the left (we can see this being done in the
lsl instruction. We then shift is again to the right by 16 bytes. Then again, this may of have been put in there by the compiler. I’ve put the assembly down below so you can see clearly whats happening.
Could look at it this way in pseudocode..
The bot has a symbol named
AnalysisAddress at at
0xB1B8, at first sight one may think this is to divert the attention of researchers — but all this subroutine does is setup a
hostent struct (http://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man3/gethostbyname.3.html) which we’ll use later on for the connection. We pass in the first parameter in the register ‘r0’ from the location
0xC1FC8 which has the value of
126.96.36.199. We put the return value os
gethostbyname into register r3 then preform some arithmetic on it.
The malware does two calls to
setsockopt, passing the
IP_DROP_SOURCE_MEMBERSHIP flag and the After the above has completed the the malware does a call to
connect to make an initial connection to the C2 server and then does a mixture of
getsockopt calls on the socket to ensure that the non-blocking socket has successfully connected. If the connection is not successful the malware will close the socket and exit.
Once we have a working socket returned from ServerConnectCli we then set the value of the global variable MainSocket to the return value. The malware then goes on to getting more statistics from the infected box. First of all, it grabs the username from the user running the executable which is placed into ‘r11’. We can see that if the ‘uname’ call fails then “Unknown” will be copied into the destination buffer which originally resided in r11, else if it is successful, will branch to
More information is gathered about the infected host via the
GetCpuInfo function. Although this is self explanatory I’ll explain it anyways. The virtual file
/proc/cpuinfo is opened and read in WORDs until an EOF (-1) is hit whilst reading the file chunk by chunk — then
fclose is called to free up the opened file. The number of CPUs is then passed back out from this method and the clock speed in MHz too.
The malware then calls
sysinfo(..) and reads into the struct (also named
sysinfo) which is originally located in r3. We then read several members of this struct, such as the total amount of swap, total amount of RAM etc.. this is all then formatted and output into a string.
We can see here that the threat actor seems to be joking about by using the string ‘Hacker’.. the string to be format is:
VERSONEX:Linux-%s|%d|%d MHz|%dMB|%dMB|%s — you’ve spelt ‘version’ wrong Mr Threat Actor. It’s very strange here that
sprintf was used before rather than
snprintf (which helps mitigate buffer overflows/format string exploits to an extent as the function knows the length of the buffer). Programmers will usually be inclined to use one naturally over the other, this indicates to myself there may be more than one programmer whom is contributing to this malware.
In the control flow we can then see that we try to then send this information on ‘MainSocket’, if the send is not successful (so, if we send 0) we branch to another subroutine and close the socket.
For those not familiar with ARM, the
beq instruction basically says if the flag is set that they are equal then jump to address
0xCBD4. This subroutine simply closes the socket, as said before. We then move onto
select, if this call is successful thence move onto reading data from the C2. We then read data from the C2, but first, we zero out the buffer that we are using and have a maximum size of
0x1380 that we want to receive. Again, if this is not successful it then prints an error message and branches to a subroutine which closes the socket and cleans up.
Conclusion, so far..
It is obvious so far that this malware has been programmed by more than one author. We can also see so far that the author has experience in socket programming. The author is also using pascal case (LikeThis) and names certain functions such as
GetCpuInfo – this could in turn indicate to us that the author is used to programming on Windows.
This is the end of this section, we will now move onto the details about the attack methods and what else the bot can be commanded to do.malware iot